Sunday, May 07, 2006

[ePalestine] IHT: Israel's personal superpower / Finkelstein: The Lobby: it's not "either-or"

Israel's personal superpower  

William Pfaff

PARIS The John Mearsheimer-Stephen Walt critique of the Israel lobby's activities and influence in the United States initially produced an attempt to silence discussion and discredit the authors, sometimes employing character assassination and the technique of guilt by association.  

This was not successful, and the issue of Israeli- American relations, as well as of the Israel lobby, has now been opened up to discussion.  

Most Americans and many Israelis may not realize that the close U.S.-Israeli alliance is relatively recent.  

The U.S. government witnessed Israel's establishment without enthusiasm.  

To Washington, Israel was an unwelcome irritant to American relations with the Arab world, where Saudi Arabia had become a principal source of oil for the United States. Israel's foreign policy throughout the 1950s was "non-identification" with either side in the Cold War.  

The predecessor of today's main Washington pro- Israel organization, Aipac, was formed in 1954. But more influential in changing American popular opinion was probably the novel "Exodus" and the movie made of it, and in 1961, the trial and condemnation of Adolph Eichmann, which brought home to many the full horror of the so-called Final Solution.  

The 1967 Six Day war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, won by Israel with great panache, was the start of the great romance between Americans and Israelis. It also produced the decision that has made Israel a pariah in the eyes of much of the world: its colonization of occupied Palestinian territories.  

Israel lives with existential realities. Its primordial interest is survival in a hostile region, where its presence was established and is maintained by violence, and where it has never been fully accepted.  

Hamas speaks for many in the region when it says that Israel is illegitimate and must eventually disappear. This probably seems to Hamas more a historical inevitability than a declaration of policy.  

Israeli interest thus is served when the Arabs are politically disorganized and conventionally powerless, as the Palestinians are now. Its interest is also served when the Arabs are divided along sectarian or ethnic lines, as is happening in Iraq, as a result of the American invasion, with the emergence of rival Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish entities.  

If a unified Iraq disappears, Iran will remain the only major Muslim state in the immediate region, with Syria a minor, if influential, actor. Hence it is in Israel's interest that the United States bring about regime change in Iran. Israelis know that such an effort could produce the same consequences as in Iraq, which could be to their advantage - although not to Washington's.  

There is, in principle, a different vision of realism available to Israel, which would not rely on the destruction of rivals and the permanence of American alliance. Israel could reverse 40 years of policy and look for security in withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories, serious negotiations to create a viable Palestinian state, and settlement of the territorial and refugee issues.  

However, I would imagine that few Israelis now believe in this possibility, after the acts of terrorism and all the blood that has been shed during the past 60 years, even though many may wish for it.  

After the Jewish experience during World War II and since, I would think that little ability survives to trust in the good will of others. Certainly not trust in the Arabs. Certainly not trust in the Europeans. In the case of the Americans, it is not good will that has to be trusted, but American willingness to believe that American and Israeli interests really do coincide - despite the fact that they do not.  

The announced American ambition is to make the Arab states into democracies and install a liberal order in the region. Israelis, being realists, understand that this is a fantasy.  

Israel's own interests depend on the exercise of power in ways unwelcome to the Arab peoples, and this depends on a permanent American willingness - and ability - to dominate the region on Israel's behalf. And this, as politically perceptive Israelis may grasp, could prove a profoundly unrealistic assumption.  

Superpowers can afford the illusion that empires "make" the reality that suits them. Small powers cannot afford such rashness. That seems to me Israel's dilemma.  

Copyright © 2006 The International Herald Tribune  


The Lobby: it's not "either-or" 

A comment by Norman G. Finkelstein

The "either-or" framework -- the Lobby or U.S. strategic interests -- isn't, in my opinion, very useful: 

(1) Apart from the Israel-Palestine confflict, fundamental U.S. policy in the Middle East hasn't been affected by the Lobby. If for different reasons, both U.S. and Israeli elites have always believed that the Arabs need to be kept subordinate. However, once the U.S. solidified its alliance with Israel after June 1967, it began to look at Israelis -- and Israelis projected themselves as -- experts on the "Arab mind." Accordingly the alliance with Israel has abetted the most truculent U.S. policies, Israelis believing that "Arabs only understand the language of force" and every few years (months?) this or that Arab country needs to be banged up. The spectrum of U.S. policy differences might be narrow but in terms of impact on the real lives of real people in the Arab world these differences are probably meaningful, the Israeli influence making things worse; 

(2) The claim that Israel has become a liability for U.S. "national" interests in the Middle East misses the bigger picture. Sometimes what's most obvious escapes the eye. Israel is the only stable and secure base for projecting U.S. power in this region. Every other country the U.S. relies on might, for all anyone knows, fall out of U.S. control tomorrow: the U.S. discovered this to its horror in 1979 after investing so much in the Shah. On the other hand, Israel was a creation of the West, it's in every respect -- culturally, politically, economically -- in thrall to the West, notably the U.S. This is true not just at the level of a corrupt leadership as elsewhere in the Arab world but -- what's most important -- at the popular level. Israel's pro-American orientation exists not just among Israeli elites but among the whole population. Come what may in Israel, then, it's inconceivable that this fundamental orientation will change. Combined with its overwhelming military power, this makes Israel a unique and irreplaceable American asset in the Middle East; 

(3) In this regard it's useful to recall the rationale behind British support for Zionism. Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann once asked a British official why the British continued to support Zionism despite Arab opposition: Didn't it make more sense for them to keep Palestine but drop support for Zionism? "Although such an attitude may afford a temporary relief and may quiet Arabs for a short time," the official replied, "it will certainly not settle the question as the Arabs don't want the British in Palestine, and after having their way with the Jews, they would attack the British position, as the Moslems are doing in Mesopotamia, Egypt and India." Another British official judged retrospectively that, however much Arab resentment it provoked, British support for Zionism was prudent policy, for it established in the midst of an "uncertain Arab world…a well-to-do educated, modern community, ultimately bound to be dependent on the British Empire." Were it even possible, the British had little interest in promoting real Jewish-Arab cooperation because it would inevitably lessen this dependence. Similarly the U.S. doesn't want an Israel truly at peace with the Arabs, for such an Israel could loosen its bonds of dependence on the U.S., making it a less reliable proxy. This is one reason why the claim that Jewish elites are "pro"-Israel makes little sense. They are "pro" an Israel that is useful to the U.S. and therefore useful to them. What use would a Paul Wolfowitz have of an Israel living peacefully with its Arab neighbors and less willing to do the U.S.'s bidding? 

(4) The historical record strongly suggests that neither Jewish neo-conservatives in particular nor mainstream Jewish intellectuals generally have a primary allegiance to Israel - in fact any allegiance to Israel. Mainstream Jewish intellectuals became "pro"-Israel after the June 1967 war when Israel became the U.S.'s strategic asset in the Middle East: i.e., when it was safe and reaped benefits. To credit them with ideological conviction is, in my opinion, very naive. They're no more committed to Zionism than the neo-conservatives among them were once committed to Trotskyism: their only ism is opportunism. As psychological types these newly- minted Lovers of Zion most resemble the Jewish police in the Warsaw ghetto. "Each day, to save his own skin, every Jewish policeman brought seven sacrificial lives to the extermination altar," a leader of the Resistance ruefully recalled. "There were policemen who offered their own aged parents, with the excuse that they would die soon anyhow." Jewish neo-conservatives watch over the U.S. "national" interest, which is the source of their power and privilege, and in the Middle East it happens that this "national" interest coincides with Israel's "national" interest. If ever these interests clashed who can doubt that, to save their own skins, they'll do exactly what they're ordered to do, with gusto? 

(5) Unlike elsewhere in the Middle East, U.S. elite policy in the Israel-Palestine conflict would almost certainly not be the same without the Lobby. What does the U.S. gain from the Israeli settlements and occupation? In terms of alienating the Arab world, it's had something to lose. The Lobby probably can't muster sufficient power to jeopardize a fundamental American interest, but it can significantly raise the threshold before U.S. elites are prepared to act -- i.e., order Israel out of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as they finally ordered the Indonesians out of Occupied East Timor. Whereas Israel doesn't have many options if the U.S. does finally give the order to pack up, the U.S. won't do so until and unless the Israeli occupation becomes a major liability for it: on account of the Lobby the point at which "until and unless" is reached significantly differs. Without the Lobby and in the face of widespread Arab resentment, the U.S. would perhaps have ordered Israel to end the occupation by now, sparing Palestinians much suffering; 

(6) The Lobby makes a huge difference in terms of trying to broaden public discussion on the Israel-Palestine conflict. It seems that in the current "either-or" debate on whether the Lobby affects U.S. Middle East policy at the elite level, it's been lost on many of the interlocutors that a crucial dimension of this debate should be the extent to which the Lobby stifles free and open public discussion on the subject. Especially since U.S. elites have no entrenched interest in the Israeli occupation, the mobilization of public opinion can have a real impact on policy-making -- which is why the Lobby invests so much energy in suppressing discussion. 

Norman G. Finkelstein's most recent book is Beyond Chutzpah: On th e misuse of anti- Semitism and the abuse of history (2005). His website can be reached at 


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